Why doomsday arguments are better than simulation arguments
I. Doomsday Arguments
Doomsday arguments ('DA') apply anthropic and Bayesian intuitions to our location in history. In particular, DA aim to raise our personal probability for human extinction, conditional on our historical birth-rank.
1 Supposedly you're more likely to be located where you are (i.e. have the birth-rank you do) if humanity's future is short rather than long. If the c. 7 billion people now alive represent roughly one-tenth of all people there have ever been, contemporary humans have birth-ranks c. 70 billion. If the last human birth-rank is a) 71 billion, only 1.4% of birth-ranks exceed 70 billion. However, if the last human birth-rank is b) 70 trillion, 99.9% of birth-ranks exceed 70 billion. With a), a substantial fraction of all the people there will ever be live now; with b), we are unusually early people. DA says: if you want your location to appear as probable as our evidence allows, do not expect many more humans to be born. (DA concerns rational expectation -it does not prophesy unavoidable Doom.)
In Bayesian fashion, DA urges us to favour whichever explanation gives our location greatest conditional probability, and our present location is supposedly more probable on hypotheses that make future population smaller rather than larger. The referenceclass DA uses is clear and unexceptionable, comprising simply human beings. However, before it can change our probabilities and generate probability-shifts towards Doom, DA needs some specifications about probability distribution. In particular, DA must specify i) how different population-hypotheses receive prior probabilities and ii) how population-hypotheses confer likelihoods on birth-ranks.
Popular ways to generate DA priors invoke a Principle of Indifference: for example, choose some (big-but-finite) figure for the largest possible human population, (call it 'n'), and then give each population-hypothesis the same prior probability of 1/n. Likewise, one might address ii) by allocating any particular birth-rank i a likelihood of 1/j conditional on total population being j, (where i j). DA's conclusions need both prior and likelihood assumptions. For example, if priors rise proportionally with the population postulated, then prior and likelihood assumptions cancel out and no overall Bayesian shift conditional on birth-rank occurs.
II. The Simulation Argument
Nick Bostrom's Simulation Argument ('SA') is inspired by DA but (Bostrom claims 4 we offer posterior-probabilistic and likelihood-ratio arguments for rejecting SA and for preferring DA to SA. If successful, this attempt is significant not least because Bostrom (2003) regards SA as more robust and probabilistically economical than DA.
For argument's sake, let's grant SA that: i) Sim-hood is not a radically sceptical prospect, e.g. Sims are not brains-in-vats or dupes of Evil Demons, ii) sufficiently complex simulations are fully-conscious Sims, and iii) all our experiences are compatible with our Sim-hood. In which case, Bostrom says, our credence for being a Sim should derive directly from our expected fraction of Sims:
If we knew that a fraction x of all observers with human-type experiences live in simulations, and we have no information to indicate that our own particular experiences are any more or less likely than other human-type experiences to have been implemented in vivo rather than in machina then our credence that we are in a simulation should equal x. (Bostrom 2003: 249) Bostrom thinks these assumptions suggest one of three things: 1) posthumans are rare, 2) posthumans rarely run Sims, or 3) we're probably Sims. (N.B. Bostrom defends only this threeoption disjunction and not any option in particular.) If these options are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, evidence against 1) and 2) favours 3). Hence Bostrom says our making Sims would undermine 'rare posthumans' and 'rare Sims' hypotheses, suggesting our probability of Sim-hood 1:
If we do go on to create our own ancestor-simulations, . . . we would therefore have to conclude that we live in a simulation. Moreover, we would have to suspect that the posthumans running our simulation are themselves simulated beings; and their creators in turn may also be simulated beings. (Bostrom 2003: 253) Simulation has characteristic structural and epistemic asymmetries. Structurally, if Sim-hierarchies grow from a primary 'basement', higher levels are causal descendants of lower ones. Epistemically, Bostrom's assumptions suggest we should know if ours is a simulating level but we cannot expect to know if ours is a simulated level. Bostrom requires these asymmetries, e.g. so you cannot dismiss your Sim-hood simply because you observe no one simulating you. Bostrom's (2003: 254) 'naturalistic theogony' even imagines lower simulation-levels behaving as gods towards the higher levels they simulate, manipulating higher levels' local physics and bestowing rewards/punishments as seems appropriate.
Simulation hypotheses and SA are independent, and accepting one need not imply any particular attitude towards the other. Simulation hypotheses imagine reality to be a (perhaps highly) ramified simulation-structure; SA maintains technologically-optimistic functionalists face Bostrom's trilemma. You might think SA sound but reject your Sim-hood, e.g. because you do not believe posthumans exist. You might think SA unsound but believe you're a Sim because you think (e.g.) your simulators have contacted you directly or you've observed a glitch in your local environment's programming. Again, Bostrom advocates only SA and its disjunctive trilemma.
III. Anti-Simulation 'Lottery'
We can make some deductions about our location in simulating worlds. If we're Sims, we necessarily inhabit some form of Simhierarchy, whether highly ramified or not. Assuming simulation does not occur naturally (i.e. without conscious direction), Sim-hierarchies must grow from a basement level of unsimulated simulators and end with a ceiling level of unsimulating Sims. Necessarily, the basement level ('L B ') lacks ancestors, the ceiling level ('L 1 ') lacks descendants and all intermediate levels L 2 -L B-1 contain simulating Sims. Each Sim can occupy only one level in any hierarchy, so any hypotheses about our level-number will be mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. In turn, the all-important simulating links between levels must observe the following conditions:
Irreflexivity 2 no level can be its own simulation Asymmetry 2 no two (or more) levels can reciprocally simulate Given there are minds, reality has at least one level (i.e. j > 0) so if L 1 has finite resources, 1 j < 1.
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We do not (and likely cannot) know how many levels may lie below ours but we do have some relevant data about our hierarchy position nonetheless: clearly we do not simulate, having 'neither sufficiently powerful hardware nor the requisite software to create conscious minds in computers', (Bostrom, 2003: 245) , and hence ours is a 'ceiling' level. The nature of simulation yields a striking asymmetry between simulating and unsimulating levels. Simulating levels predominate if j > 2 but unsimulating levels predominate iff j 5 1, (i.e. no simulation occurs). All else being equal, simulating 5 'One consideration that counts against the multi-level hypothesis is that the computational cost for the basement-level simulators might be prohibitively great', Bostrom (2003, p. 253) . Later, we argue that anti-simulation arguments need not assume any finite cap on the number of levels and can still run even if the basement can possess (literally) infinite resources and run infinitely many levels.
FOR DOOMSDAY, AGAINST SIMULATION levels will be more common in (especially highly ramified) simulation hierarchies than unsimulating levels, and the greater the ramification, the more numerous simulating levels will be. Following Bradley and Fitelson (2003: 25), we construct an anti-hierarchy 'lottery' argument by numbering simulation-levels like DA birth-ranks: n 5 'The largest possible level-number', e.g. three. H j 5 'Hypothesis: j levels exist in total', (where j can be any finite integer 1 and hypotheses H j are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive).
Two remarks: 1) Bradley and Fitelson (2003) set n at 3 but any finite n will do. Low n-values are obviously idealisations for DA but markedly more realistic for SA. (Clearly more than three people have existed, barring some hyperbolically sceptical hypothesis obtaining, but our present evidential basis could be exactly the same with 100, 1 or 0 Sim-levels below ours.) 2) No level-number can exceed the level-total, e.g. no L 5 if only four levels exist. (Cf. the DA logical constraint that no birth-rank number can exceed that of the last-born human.) So, our DA-inspired anti-hierarchy 'lottery':
0:61 0:27
0:61 0:54
Note that whereas in Brandon and Fitelson (2003), j numbers all the people there will ever have been, j herein numbers simulation-levels at a time. As the referee for this paper suggested, taking level-numbers (rather than times) as our values offers a further advantage: even if we could somehow know the all-time total of levels would be 'N', the prior for N levels existing already might be only 1/N. If the probability of N levels eventually existing is 1/N, the prior that N levels already exist equals (1/N) 2 . 7 Please note this assumption of uniform priors is for illustrative purposes only -see later on substituting Jeffreys' priors for equiprobable priors. Furthermore, this result generalises so P(
If your level is L i , each H j has its probability shifted by
8 The more levels, the less probable this one becomes. Conditional on occupying L i in a j-level hierarchy, your location becomes more probable as j ! i and occupying level L j is maximally probable iff j 5 1. If you're unsure how many levels exist, assume no ancestral levels exists.
9
In several respects, SA and DA are evidentially asymmetrical. DA 'lotteries' presuppose ancestor-numbers when assessing our future prospects; the anti-Simulation 'lottery' above presupposes we lack any (simulated) successors when assessing how many (simulating) ancestors we might have. While DA needs birth-rank data, direct evidence of ancestral Sim-levels would make SA redundant. If we somehow learned that five ancestral simulating levels lay below ours, then we would thereby learn we're Sims. In this (obviously counterfactual) case, SA becomes redundant via increase in data, but then compare the (counterfactual) redundancy of DA if we (somehow) acquired census data from the future.
Seemingly ours cannot be a simulating level but our 'lottery' assumptions suggest our level becomes unlikely if it's the unsimulating terminus of a simulation-hierarchy. An unsimulating location has the highest conditional probability in an unsimulated world, and such a location is consistent with our best evidence to date. Anyone who elects to update belief in Sim-hood following Bostrom should also factor in this counter-balancing DA-style 'lottery' argument. Our lacking simulation-technology is relevant to our likely location. The fewer ancestral levels, the more probable this location. Prima facie the 'lottery' suggests mild probabilistic assumptions suggest we should not believe we live in a simulation hierarchy, especially a highly-stratified one. Without contesting Bostrom's disjuncts, we need not derive credences for Sim-hood directly from our expected fraction of Sims. However, the above Just to forestall one objection: one could bestow high likelihood on being where (and who) one is by embracing solipsism, (i.e. because there is literally no one and nowhere else to be), but this likelihood would come at considerable empirical and (especially) explanatory cost. 
IV. Priors and Likelihoods
Following some standard DA presentations, the above uses a uniform prior distribution over all hypotheses assigning numbers to simulation levels. However, DA is adaptable to more nuanced assignments of priors. For example, we could adopt Jeffreys (1932) and (1946) 'uninformed' prior P(h) / ͱI(h), where 'I' is the Fisher information. 10 In developing Gott's (1993) DA, 11 Gott (1994) 12 adopts a Jeffreys 'vague prior' whereby P(N) 5 k/N, where N is the all-time total of humans and k is a normalising constant. 13 If anything, such prior functions seem better adapted to SA than DA. Computations have associated costs -see again Bostrom (2003: 253) . Replacing the lottery's original uniform priors with Jeffreys' priors merely strengthens the conclusion that
Bostrom ultimately charges DA with failure through using a flawed indifference principle, i.e. one which would treat all birthranks as equiprobable and randomly-selected even though we know we live c. 2015 CE. Thus DA flouts the total evidence requirement in discounting data about our current historical position. Instead ). An anonymous referee makes a further intriguing suggestion here, for which the author is very grateful: combining infinite n with the Jeffreys prior, section 3's calculation yields P(H1jL1) 5 1/2. So even starting from a tiny prior that no Sims exist, (i.e. P(H1) 0), adding the information that we are not simulators gives a posterior probability of 0.5 for there being no Sims.
11 J. Richard Gott III, 'Implications of the Copernican Principle for Our Future Prospects', Nature, Vol. 363, 1993, pp. 315-9.
12 J. Richard Gott III, 'Future Prospects Discussed: Gott Replies', Nature, Vol. 368, 1994, pp. 108. 13 Cf. 'Jeffreys's prior is perhaps the most widely used noninformative prior in Bayesian analysis. For the binomial regression model, Jeffreys's prior is attractive because it is proper under mild conditions and requires no elicitation of hyperparameters whatsoever. The only requirement is a likelihood function from which the prior is then derived using Jeffrey's rule, which is to take the prior distribution to be the determinant of the square root of the ('BIP'), counselling 'indifference only between hypotheses about which observer one is, when one has no information about which of these observers one is'.
14 Surely indifference principles, which seem to conjure numerical probabilities from ignorance, should be avoided if possible. However, firstly, it's not clear Bostrom's BIP addresses the real difficulty with indifference principles, i.e. deriving numerical probabilities from distributions. 15 Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, rather than rely on some prior justification of indifference principles, anti-simulation arguments' prior and likelihood assumptions can be substantially re-cast.
Suppose (for argument's sake) one takes an austere view of prior probabilities. Bradley and Fitelson (2003: 27 ff.) offer suggestions for turning posterior-probabilistic DA into confirmationtheoretic DA, en route eliminating and weakening 'prior' and 'likelihood' assumptions respectively. Bayes' Theorem can translate the posterior-probabilistic question 'Is P(H 1 jL 1 )/ P(H 1 ) > P(H 2 jL 1 )/P(H 2 )?' into the (logically equivalent) likelihood question 'Is P(L 1 jH 1 ) > P(L 1 jH 2 )?'. A revised likelihood assumption that P(L i jH j ) declines as j increases means P(L i jH k ) > P(L i jH j ) for all (i k < j) but without 'indifference' assumptions or precise numerical likelihood.
V. Branching Hierarchies
Thus far, we've not made explicit assumptions about how simulation hierarchies are structured. As reciprocal simulation is ruled out, hierarchies must either grow linearly or branch upward like trees. However so far, we've numbered levels as though Simhierarchies must be linear, i.e. only one simulated world per simulation level. This assumption seems unduly limiting. For example, if hierarchies branch, there will necessarily be more simulated worlds than there are simulation levels.
The simple bifurcating simulation hierarchy above features four levels but fifteen worlds -eight of the latter unsimulating and hence in the majority.
In the branching hierarchy above, living in an unsimulating location may make you an unusual Sim qua level but rather more typical qua world, e.g. if most Sims reside in unsimulating worlds. However, while hierarchies might branch in any number of ways, we need only assume that occupying any particular world declines in prior probability or likelihood the more worlds a hierarchy holds. Let 'N a ' be 'this world is number a' and 'W x ' be 'this hierarchy holds x worlds in total', where P(N a jW x ) 5 0 if (a > x). (For example, in the hierarchy drawn above, x is fifteen.) If P(N a jW x ) decreases as x rises, then P(N a jW b ) > P(N a jW x ) for all (a b < x). If probability of location declines with degree of ramification (whether this is taken qua number of levels and/or number of worlds), then our location is maximally likely iff no other Sim-worlds or levels exist. We could further simplify by reducing the relevant hypotheses to two: namely divide our classes of relevant observers into simulates and unsimulates, and thus our levels into basement and ceiling accordingly.
VI. 'Prussian' or 'English' Likelihoods?
Our arguments that i) P(L i jH k ) > P(L i jH j ) for all (i k < j) and ii) P(N a jW b ) > P(N a jW x ) for all (a b < x) assume locations get less likely as they grow more numerous. But this could be contested, e.g. if simulation exhibits economies of scale, then more ramified hierarchies are more cost-effective.
However, we could streamline our likelihood assumptions still further: any explanation giving its explanandum likelihood 1 has the advantage that no higher likelihood can be conferred. Let 'H x ' mean 'One level exists' (i.e. no simulation) and 'H y ' mean 'More than one level/Sim-world exists' (i.e. simulation occurs). H x confers likelihood 1 on our (unsimulating) location being unique, so P(L 1 jH x ) 5 1, and necessarily P(L 1 jH y ) P(L 1 jH x ). So at best, H x and H y confer identical likelihoods on our being unsimulating even if we assume that overall degree of ramification in no way diminishes the likelihood of our occupying the particular location that we do. Why choose H x ? Well, one might retort: why assume degree of ramification has no impact on likelihood of location? It seems perverse to insist that there is no evidential advantage to choosing Theory X over Theory Y, where both are empirically equivalent yet X prescribes you have one possible location and Y gives you an indefinitely large (perhaps infinite) number of supposedly distinct but indistinguishable (from our perspective) locations. Better still, H x is not only empirically adequate but has the unique advantage that it necessitates our occupying an unsimulating level. Empirical adequacy and maximising likelihood both favour H x . However, if H y were true, necessarily our level is not alone. Another empirical advantage of H x : assuming we observe no evidence we are being simulated (and SA must make this assumption on pain of redundancy otherwise), this too is a datum on which H x (uniquely) confers likelihood 1. Hence another significant contrast with DA: short of (very implausibly) postulating that it is somehow constitutive of our identity that we have the particular birth-ranks that we do, no populationhypothesis can possibly confer likelihood 1 on our having birthranks c. 70 billion.
As one more fillip for choosing H x , consider van Fraassen's favouring 'English' over 'Prussian' conceptions of rationality.
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'Prussian' views dismiss everything not expressly permitted as irrational, whereas 'English' views think everything not expressly forbidden is rational: 'Van Fraassen opts for the latter view, so according to him rationality is a permission term and not an obligation term'. 17 Even if rationality does not (Prussian-wise) forbid H y , no inconsistency or irrationality attends choosing H x . Any moment may reveal compelling evidence we live in a Simhierarchy but until then, why accept H y when H x is empirically adequate? H y says precisely nothing about why our location is (or appears) non-simulating, whereas H x (uniquely) necessitates this state. If H x is true then necessarily all observer-moments inhabit non-simulating locations, (making it rather unsurprising if all our experiences seem to reside in non-simulating locations). Setting aside our evidence that we are non-simulators flouts the total evidence requirement.
VII. Sampling Assumptions, Reference Classes
and Other Problems a) DA often invokes a 'Self-Sampling Assumption' (SSA): 'One should reason as if one were a random sample from the set of all observers in one's reference class'. 18 DA critics often invoke a countervailing 'Self-Indication Assumption' (SIA): 'Given the fact that you exist, you should (other things equal) favour hypotheses according to which many observers exist over hypotheses on which few observers exist', (Bradley, 2005: 91) . Applying SIA to birth-ranks should yield probability-shifts towards larger populations which nullify DA-shifts towards smaller ones. 19 However, one might adopt neither SIA nor SSA, but only the weaker likelihood assumption 'Observation O supports hypothesis H 1 more than O supports hypothesis H 2 (i.e., O favors H 1 over H 2 ) if and only if Pr(OjH 1 ) > Pr(OjH 2 )', 20 with the rider that H 1 is especially preferable to H 2 if 1 5 Pr(OjH 1 ) > Pr(OjH 2 ). b) While SA uses a version of SSA, Bostrom generally favours a strengthened SSA, which takes a reference-class of observer-moments rather than observers. 21 Strengthened SSA says: believe your current observer-moment resides where you think most observer-moments reside. Hence if you think most observer-moments are enjoyed by Sims, strengthened SSA should suggest you're probably a Sim.
Sometimes Bostrom (2002: 181) even goes so far as to define reference classes using observer-moments: 'A reference class definition is a partition of possible observer-moments; each equivalence class in the partition is the reference class for all the observer-moments included in it'. Clearly the referenceclasses used herein use Sim-levels or Sim-worlds, and not observer-moments. Do our reference-classes not simply beg the question against Bostrom? No: as Bostrom (2003) illustrates, choosing and assessing reference-classes belongs to the pragmatics of explanation, and we submit reference-classes are not obliged to partition over observer-moments.
As an example of explanatory pragmatics here, one might assess reference-class choices consequentially, i.e. in light of the inferences they support. (If logic alone will not fix reference classes for us, the invocation of explanatory and/or pragmatic considerations in selecting reference classes seems inescapable.) 22 Bostrom (2002: 73-88) seems to adopt, and thus at least implicitly sanction, such consequentialist strategies for assessing reference classes in defending his strengthened SSA. For example, Bostrom grants that standard SSA has unpalatable consequences, notably supporting DA, which do not redound to SSA's credit. This seems plausible. Bostrom also thinks moving from observer-partitioned SSA to strengthened (observermoment-partitioned) SSA undermines DA, and this result too seems robust. It's also plausible that reference classes gain credit by not licensing DA. (Of course our reference-classes of Sim-levels or Sim-worlds do not favour DA either.) However, the mere fact that SA uses reference-classes defined over observers (or observer-moments) does not support this definition in itself and indeed constitutes prima facie reason for scepticism about strengthened SSA. Assessing the plausibility of referenceclasses consequentially, in the light of the inferences they support, is a strategy far more likely to undermine SA than to support it. Note our claim is not that (e.g.) we can safely disregard observer-moment partitions in general, cheerfully assign observers with identical experiential content to different reference classes on a whim or regard this reference-class as somehow generally suspect. Rather, we grant that observer-moment reference classes may be one of a range of useful choices -however, we do not accept that such reference-classes are rationally obligatory and should be adhered to universally regardless of any other unlikelihoods they may bring in their wake. Again, reference-class choices can and should be assessed consequentially. Bostrom (2002: 183-205 ) applies strengthened SSA to many observer-effect problems and claims observer-moment reference classes offer many advantages. However, other anthropic arguments (like DA) use salient reference-classes of species, individuals or spatial locations. One might permit only observermoment reference classes by fiat but such draconian manoeuvres are under-motivated. We submit instead that no (epistemic or other) norms are broken by invoking reference-classes which are not partitioned in observer-moments, especially in cases where an observer-moment partition brings concomitant unlikelihoods in its wake. Bostrom's 'consequentialist' choice of reference-classes faces the tu quoque objection that strengthened SSA has its own counter-intuitive consequences, e.g. supporting SA.
We have some data about our hierarchy location and no reason to think most Sims inhabit unsimulating locations. We need not show that adopting reference-classes of Sim-levels or Simworlds is compulsory; all we need is that updating beliefs with Bostrom brings a concomitant unlikelihood of location. Following other anthropic arguments, one might adopt a partition of reference-classes over worlds rather than moments. Tying SA to one reference-class also narrows its constituency to those who i) accept functionalism, ii) allow only observer-moment referenceclasses and iii) think most observers inhabit unsimulating worlds. (Of course assumptions i), ii) and iii) are mutually independent.)
Bostrom's observer-moments reference-class invites questions about how defining reference-classes relates to the merits of epistemic internalism and externalism. 23 Bostrom's reference- 23 Bostrom (2003) and Weatherson (2003) consider how externalism affects SA.
class seems to comprise our doxastic (or phenomenological) alternates, but then Sims and non-Sims need not be assigned to the same reference-class merely in virtue of their being indistinguishable experientially by us. DA's reference-class is more compelling than SA's, since DA appeals to comparatively uncontroversial species-membership, whose criteria are biologically robust and not epistemically contrived. Granted, we might wonder how far back our species stretches, but sameness of experiential content is neither necessary nor sufficient for being human. So one more DA advantage: it needs no particular stance re: externalism or internalism. c) One worrying DA feature is that its Bayesian apparatus always generates probabilistic shifts towards shorter futures, whatever the present population or its history. Sober (2003) argues likelihood judgements must be empirical and case-by-case, hence no general DA succeeds. In general, conferring high likelihood on explananda does not suffice to make hypotheses plausible: 'If I hear noises in my attic, the hypothesis that there are gremlins bowling up there has a likelihood of unity, but few of us would say that this hypothesis is very probable', (Sober, 2003: 424) . Evidence will make some hypotheses (and hence likelihoods) more plausible than others. We can reject DA's principle of giving birth-ranks likelihoods which are inversely proportional to total population but yet accept the (H x ) likelihoods in the anti-SA confirmation-theoretic argument. Likelihoods are no more defeasible or contextdependent than reference classes, but the (H x ) likelihood is robustly plausible and evidence-driven. Many imaginable defeaters could give Sim-hood high probability, e.g. widespread programming 'glitches', communications from simulators, etc. However, we observe no such defeaters. Using Bostrom's reference-class, we might wonder why most observer-moments occur in apparently unsimulating worlds. Why would posthumans especially favour unsimulating Sims? Sober's (2003) 25 argue that DA fails (in part) because it mistakenly conflates humanity's total duration and future duration: 'confirmation of smaller total populations is not equivalent to confirmation of smaller future populations', (Lewis 2010: 29).
VIII. Conclusions
For as long as our experience remains neutral over our Sim-hood, any support for SA must be explanatory and/or confirmatory. Both Sim hypotheses and Bostrom's BIP seem coherent but 24 neither SA's disjunction nor its credence function are compelling. Relevant data about our location support a probability-shift against living in a Sim-hierarchy. With present evidence, updating beliefs toward Sim-hood implies a concomitantly unlikely location qua Sim-level (or Sim-world). These various hypotheses cannot be disentangled, since anyone living in a Sim-hierarchy necessarily occupies some Sim-level/world or other. This conflict undermines updating beliefs using Bostrom's BIP alone. Instead one could justifiably adopt whichever hypothesis gives our unsimulating location the highest probability. Given very weak assumptions, if we would have our location as observers appear probable then currently we should not believe in any other Sim-levels or Sim-worlds connected to ours. Bostrom (2002 passim) convincingly argues that anthropic reasoning can help science explain a host of disparate phenomena. However, if anthropic reasoning remains in disrepute, DA and SA are partly to blame. DA needs disentangling from SA, and anthropic arguments from both. At least DA uses far more robust metaphysical, epistemic and reference-class assumptions than SA. (So, of the two, it's far better to choose DA.) However, invoking the total evidence requirement and/or seeking genuine salience in reference classes undermines both. Metaphysical gerrymandering can easily yield high probabilities for locations qua observer, level or world. This is not the place to settle how to choose reference-classes. However, three constraints might be emphasised: i) similarity in phenomenal content between observers is neither necessary nor sufficient for assigning them to a common reference-class, ii) being embedded in worlds with causallydifferent structures can legitimately be a sufficient condition for assigning observers to different reference-classes, and iii) causal dissimilarity can legitimately trump phenomenal similarity in assessing reference-classes. Howsoever phenomenologically similar simulated and unsimulated worlds are allowed to be, they must differ profoundly in their physical and modal structure, and hence straightforwardly assigning their inhabitants to the same reference-class can (and ought to) be resisted on that basis alone. However, if we also apply to this problem the sort of consequentialist strategy adopted by Bostrom, we can further argue that SA's reference-class currently brings a concomitant striking unlikelihood of location in its wake.
Our best current theories of the world's causal structure seem entirely compatible with a short or a long human future. Likewise, we've no reason yet to think that humans in shorter-future scenarios must belong to different reference-classes from humans in longer-future ones. Hence still further advantages of DA: Doom may be imminent or it may be indefinitely deferred, without our understanding of the world's nomological structure or our grasp of what it takes to qualify as human being affected either way. Probability of location is not such a desideratum that it must be sought at any metaphysical or epistemic cost, and very unlike DA, Bostrom's SA uses an eminently resistible choice of referenceclass. Although not leading to compelling conclusions in their own right, DA nonetheless enjoy marked advantages in joint probabilistic, explanatory and metaphysical economy and power over SA, and accepting the latter is by no means an inevitable concomitant of accepting the former. A host of different explanatory considerations from Bayes' Theorem and the total evidence requirement to the likelihood principle and 'permissive' views of rationality reinforce our central claim that Doomsday arguments really are better than Simulation arguments.
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